The object of re-structuring for which there
is a widespread clamour among Nigerians, is not to break up the country or to
enable agitators to secede from its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Far
from that, the object is, by reforming the governmental structures and attuning
them to the needs and wishes of the people, to ensure that the immense
diversity of ethnic nationalities comprised in the state will continue to
co-exist together in peace, prosperity and progress as citizens of one country
united by common interests, common aspirations and a common destiny.
The clamour
for Re-structuring must therefore be seen as a clamour for the setting up of
appropriate platforms or fora to renegotiate suitable governmental structures
for the pursuit and realization of our common needs for development, good
governance and national transformation.
In short,
the clamour for re-structuring is more than a clamour for the reform of our
governmental structures. This is only its primary focus. In its wider, more
fundamental focus, it is a call for Nigeria to “make a new beginning” under a
new Constitution approved and adopted by the people at a Referendum, a new
politico-legal order that will cleanse the country of the rottenness that
pervades it and enable to “chart a road map for its destiny or what has been
referred to as re-structuring of the mind.” This aspect of re-structuring,
which is as necessary as its primary focus, will need to be led by a President,
as the elected Leader of the people, imbued with an ardour for national
transformation.
The
governmental structure that needs particularly to be reformed by re-structuring
is our federal system. Federalism is commonly agreed to be a compelling
necessity for the maintenance of peace, stability and development of Nigeria as
one country. The 1960/1963 Constitutions of Nigeria established a federal
system with three (later four) Regions each invested with sufficient autonomy
to govern itself in matters that concerned it alone – internal self-government
– without undue control by, or interference from, the Centre, thus giving each
Region the impetus and incentive to develop optimally in healthy competition
with the others. The federal system under the two Constitutions (1960 and 1963)
may fairly be described as a model of true federalism.
Regrettably,
the intrusion of absolutist military rule for 28 years after 1965 has brought
about the accretion of a vast amount of additional powers to the Centre, over
and above what they were under the 1960/63 Constitutions, resulting in the
system being turned virtually into a unitary system; the system is still tagged
federal, but it is so largely in name.
There are
certain matters involved in this, undue concentration of powers and financial
resources at the Centre that need to be specifically mentioned, viz
(i)
It is a
manifest contradiction to conceive of a government, whether in a federal or
unitary system, without a constitution. There is just no such thing. The very
notion of a government necessarily implies a constitution. Separate
governments, as required by federalism, necessarily imply a separate
constitution for each of the governments.
(ii)
The
contradiction of a state or government without a separate coercive force of its
own and under its independent control to maintain its existence and authority
as a government and to enforce its laws. States exist, says D’treaves, according as they have a coercive
force to exact obedience to their commands. It is certainly incompatible with
the notion of a separate government for each of the constituent units in a
federal system that the only coercive force for the maintenance of their
existence and authority as a government and for the enforcement of their laws
is placed under the control of the Federal Government. The federating units in
Nigeria need to have their separate and independent police force to conform
with the requirements of federalism.
(iii)
The
incompatibility with the autonomy of a constituent unit in a federal system
that the election of its political functionaries – governor, members of its
legislative assembly and local government councils – should be conducted by an
organ of the Federal Government.
(iv)
The
extension of federal power to the control of land. Land title is now largely
exclusive to the Federal Government, for not only is the Land Use Act 1978
entrenched in the Constitution (s.315(5)), but also its provisions are to
“continue to have effect as federal enactments and as if they related to
matters included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part 1 of the
Second Schedule to this Constitution”.
(v)
Aspects of
local government are now also brought within the purview of the Federal
Government. The extension of federal power to aspects of local government
offends against the principle that local government is an example par excellence of a matter of local concern which places it
squarely within the exclusive competence of the Regions or States.
(vi)
Over-concentration
in the Federal Government of power with respect to the disposition of the pool
of money in the Federation Account. The 1999 Constitution in section 162(1)
establishes a pool of revenue belonging to all three levels of government,
federal, state and local government, called the Federation Account, “into which
shall be paid ALL revenues collected by the Government of the Federation,
except the proceeds from the personal income tax of the personnel of the Armed
Forces of the Federation, the Nigeria Police Force, the Ministry or department
of government charged with responsibility for Foreign Affairs and the residents
of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja”.
Section 162
of the 1999 Constitution, with its ten subsections, is a negation of true
federalism because of the undue preponderance of power vested in the Central
Government with respect to the control of the money in the Federation Account.
True federalism is negated by the undue preponderance of power given to the
Federal Government to regulate or control the disposition of the common pool of
revenue in the Federation Account, particularly as regards (a) the custody of
the common pool of revenue, with the power of physical control and physical
disbursement implied by custody; and (b) the power given to the Federal
Government to prescribe the terms and
manner of sharing the common pool of
money among the federal, state and local governments.
(a)Custody of the common pool of money
Custody of
the common pool of revenue by the federal government, (with the power of
physical control and physical disbursement implied by custody) flows from the
provision of section 162(1) that “the Federation shall maintain a special
account to be called the Federation Account”. The word “maintain” in section
162(1) implies custody, possession, and the making of payments or disbursements
of money in the Account in amounts authorised by law.
But it does
not imply that the federal government is the owner of the money in the Account,
with power to make payments from it to the state and local governments as
recipients of its largesse, which is the notion underlying President Olusegun
Obasanjo’s Monitoring of Revenue Allocation to Local Government Act 2005
(commonly referred to as the Monitoring Act). Far from the federal government
being the owner, the money in the Federation Account belongs in common to it, the
states and local governments.
The
statement above accords with what obtains in actual practice. Every month
officials of the state governments, including quite often the state Governor
himself, go, cap-in-hand, as it were, to Abuja for their share of the money in
the Federation Account disbursed or paid out to them by officials of the
federal government as paymaster. The hassle of getting payment keeps them in
Abuja for days on end, and is a negation of true federalism; it simply
caricatures true federalism.
(b)Power
given to the National Assembly under section 162(3) to prescribe the terms and
manner of sharing the common pool of money
The power
given to the Federal Government under section 162(3) of the Constitution, to
prescribe the terms and manner of sharing the money in the Federation
Account among the federal, state and local governments is a somewhat
over-bearing power in a federal system.
The words,
“terms and manner”, enable the National Assembly to determine by law the
percentages of the money to go to each level of government. The effect of the
power given to the federal government by section 162(3) is to place in its
hands the control of 90 per cent of the total revenue sources of the states.
By means of
this power the National Assembly can reduce the state governments to the
position of almost complete dependence on, or subordination to, the federal
government, by making the allocation on terms that will allow to the states
only a very small share of the revenue, so small as not to have any meaningful
bearing on their financial needs as determined by the functions assigned to
them by the Constitution.
To take an
extreme example, an allocation of, say 5 per cent, to the state and local
governments, though it may be against the spirit of the provision, will be in
accordance with its letters, and therefore a constitutionally valid exercise of
the National Assembly’s unqualified discretion to prescribe the proportion or
percentage to go to the state and local governments.
It is not of
course being suggested that there is any real likelihood of the National
Assembly, in the exercise of this power, ever disregarding the needs and
legitimate claims of state and local governments in the way supposed in the
example above. Yet the possibility that it may do so remains, with its
undermining effect on fiscal federalism.
Section 162,
with its ten sub sections, should be expunged from any new Constitution and be
replaced by new provisions that conform with the requirements of fiscal
federalism.
(vii)
Resource control.
The provision in section 162(2) proviso that “the principle of derivation shall
be constantly reflected in any approved formula as being not less than thirteen
per cent of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any
natural resources” runs counter to resource control as a principle of true and fiscal federalism.
Keeping
aside for a moment the interpretative problem raised by this
not-too-clearly-worded proviso, the provision is the source of much of the
agitation about resource control. The effect of the provision is to leave it to
the Federal Government to determine in its discretion what the allocation based
on derivation should be, so long as it is not less than 13 per cent, which
seems to negate or to run counter to
the principle of fiscal federalism.
Fiscal
federalism requires that “mines and minerals including oil fields, oil mining,
geological surveys and natural gas” should be a residual matter within the
exclusive competence of the Regions or States. Power with respect to these
matters should therefore be expunged from the Exclusive Legislative List and be
made a residual matter in accordance with the requirements of true and fiscal
federalism.
Re-structuring,
as it is presently being demanded, seeks to revert our federal system to the
true federalism of the 1960/63 Constitutions, to further reduce the powers of
the Federal Government as may be thought necessary, and to reverse the specific
matters mentioned above. The intention, furthermore, is to assuage, to an optimal
extent, the demand for self-determination or self-government consistent with
the territorial sovereignty of the country.
Self-determination
connotes essentially, not independent government, but the right of each group,
within the territorial sovereignty of the country as one state, to govern
itself in matters that concern it alone, without undue control by the Federal
Government; the control is oppressive because it is being exercised without due
regard to the requirements of justice, fairness and equity.
The ethnic
nationalities, other than those in the meantime in charge of the Federal
Government, are groaning under the emasculating yoke of federal control, as
evidenced by the recent authoritarian proscription of the Indigenous People of
Biafra (IPOB), without first resorting to dialogue as a means for amicable
resolution of disagreements in a democracy, and without a hearing by a court of
law. Re-structuring is being demanded as a means of release from the federal
yoke.
The term
“self government” expresses the essence of Re-structuring in our understanding
of it. To reiterate, self government requires that the ethnic nationalities,
grouped together by reference to culture/language and geographical contiguity,
should be enabled to govern themselves in matters that concern them alone,
within the sovereignty of a central government common to all, with powers
appropriately circumscribed. Self government connotes therefore true
federalism.
The ethnic
nationalities should, for this purpose, be purpose, be grouped into six or
eight Zones or Regions, as federating units, without (it is suggested)
prejudice to the existing 36 States. The implementation of Re-structuring
imperatively requires a new Constitution adopted by the people at a Referendum.
News
Source: - Vanguard | September 30, 2017.
Photo Source: - Vanguard | October 23, 2016.
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